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I. CONDEMNATION
A. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
June 23, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decisionOin Kelo v. City New London.1 In a five to four decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed a divided Connecticut Supreme Court
decision upholding the right of a local government to use its eminent-
domain powers to acquire private property for economic-development
purposes and to transfer it to a private entity.
The city of New London, Connecticut, ran into economic difficulties
after some military bases closed and the population fell. The city formed
the New London Development Corporation, a nonprofit organization, to
help the city implement a plan to redevelop a ninety-acre site near a pro-
posed Pfizer Corporation pharmaceuticals plant. The development cor-
poration acquired most of the property through negotiation, but Susette
Kelo and other property owners filed suit, challenging the city's right to
condemn their properties.2
The issue in the case was whether the taking of property through emi-
nent domain as part of an economic-development project is a "public
use." 3 Both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions allow the taking of prop-
* B.B.A. Austin College, M.P.A., J.D., University of Texas; Attorney at Law, Win-
stead Sechrest & Minick P.C., Dallas, Texas. Barry Knight and Stan Lowry contributed to
this Article.
1. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use with-
out just compensation."). TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("No person's property shall be taken,
damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being
made ....").
3. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659-60.
1649
SMU LAW REVIEW
erty for public use. Justice Stephens, speaking for the majority, found
that the case turned on the question of whether the city's development
plan serves a "public purpose." The Court found that case authority de-
fined that concept broadly, reflecting the Court's long-standing policy of
deference to legislative judgment. 4 Therefore, the Court concluded that
the state's purpose of eliminating the social and economic evils of a land
oligopoly qualified as a valid public use.5 Further, the Court refused to
find that the state's act of transferring the properties to private individu-
als upon condemnation diminished the public character of the taking.6
In contrast, Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion said "To reason, as
the Court does, that the incidental public benefits resulting from the sub-
sequent ordinary use of private property render economic development
takings 'for public use' is to wash out any distinction between private and
public use of property -and thereby effectively to delete the words 'for
public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 7 The Fifth
Amendment's language imposes two distinct conditions on the exercise of
eminent domain: "The taking must be for a 'public use' and 'just compen-
sation' must be paid to the owner."8
The dissent also stated that turning the responsibility over to the states
to choose to impose additional limitations on economic development tak-
ings is an abdication of the Court's responsibility to enforce the United
States Constitution. 9 The dissent warned that "[tihe beneficiaries are
likely to be those citizens with the disproportionate influence and power
in the political process, including large corporations and development
firms. As for the victims, the government now has a license to transfer
property from those with fewer resources to those with more." 10
B. SENATE BILL 7: THE TEXAS LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
In the majority opinion, Justice Stephens concluded by emphasizing
that nothing in the Kelo opinion precludes individual states from placing
further restrictions on the exercise of the taking power."' The Texas Leg-
islature followed Justice Stephens' suggestion to place legislative restric-
tions on the exercise of the takings power.
On August 31, 2005, Governor Rick Perry signed Senate Bill 7, which
amends various statutory provisions to limit the use of the power of emi-
nent domain in the State of Texas. 12 First, the bill added Chapter 2206
4. Id. at 2663.
5. Id. at 2664.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2672 (citing Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003)).
9. Id. at 2677.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2668.
12. Press Release, Texas Governor Rick Perry, Governor Perry Signs New Loan Pro-
tecting Property Rights (Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://www.governor.state.tx.us/div-
sions/press/pressreleases/PressRelease.2005-08-31.3313; see also Tex. S.B. 7, 79th Leg., 2d
R.S. (Tex. 2005) (Senate Bill 7 does not apply to condemnation proceedings that are insti-
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"Limitations On Use of Eminent Domain" to the Texas Government
Code, which applies to any governmental or private entity.' 3
Under this new provision, a governmental or private entity may not
take private property through eminent domain to confer a private benefit
or for economic development purposes unless the economic development
is a secondary purpose resulting from community development or urban
renewal activities to eliminate a slum or blighted area. 14 A condemnor's
determination that a taking does not confer a private benefit and com-
plies with section 2206.001(b) does not create a presumption of validity. 15
There are express exceptions in the bill from the limitation on the use
of eminent domain. The new regulations do not affect transportation
projects: ports; water, wastewater, flood, and drainage projects; public
buildings, hospitals, and parks; utilities; a sport- and community-venue
project approved at an election on or before December 1, 2005; the oper-
ation of a common carrier or energy transporter; public utilities under
Chapter 181 of the Utilities Code; underground-storage operations; a
waste-disposal project; or a library, museum, or related facility or infra-
structure. 16 A governmental entity may condemn a leasehold estate on
property owned by the governmental entity.17
Senate Bill 7 also amends the Education Code to prevent a university
from using eminent domain to acquire land for a lodging facility or park-
ing for such a facility.18 Senate Bill 7 also requires notice to certain prop-
erty owners by a charitable corporation that seeks to acquire real
property by condemnation or seeks to purchase property that the corpo-
ration intends to use in a manner that would not comply with deed
restrictions. 19
tuted or a deed that is filed of record before the effective date of Senate Bill 7, which is
November 18, 2005. A taking for which condemnation proceedings were instituted before
the effective date of Senate Bill 7 is governed by the law in effect immediately before that
date).
13. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(a) (Vernon 2005).
14. Id. § 2206.001(b).
15. Id. § 2206.001(e) states: "(e) The determination by the governmental or private
entity proposing to take the property that the taking does not involve an act or circum-
stances prohibited by Subsection (b) does not create a presumption with respect to
whether the taking involves that act or circumstance."
16. Id. § 2206.001(c).
17. Id. § 2206.001(d) ("This section does not affect the authority of a governmental
entity to condemn a leasehold estate on property owned by the governmental entity.").
18. TEX. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 51.9045 (Vernon 2005). According to newspaper ac-
counts, a state representative allegedly added this amendment to prohibit the University of
Texas at Austin from condemning a popular hamburger restaurant, owned by his cousin, to
build a parking garage and hotel. Polly Ross Hughes, House Gives Approval to Property
Rights Bill/Measure Would Curb Government Power of Seizure, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Aug. 10, 2005, at B6, available at, http://wwwchron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=
2005_3893926.




In Whittington v. City of Austin, the Austin Court of Appeals held that
the City of Austin did not meet its summary-judgment burden regarding
its authority to condemn eight downtown lots for an unspecified "public
use." 20 The court pointed out that there are two components of "public
use" under the Texas Constitution. First, the condemnor must intend the
use to be "public" under Texas law. Second, the condemnation must ac-
tually be necessary to advance the ostensible use.2 1 Whether or not a use
is a "public use" is a matter of law and requires more than a simple legis-
lative declaration. 22
In this case, the city did not specify what the intended public use was in
its resolution authorizing the condemnation.2 3 Furthermore, the city
failed to meet its burden of showing there was a "necessity" for the con-
demnation. Because the city's resolutions failed to address either the
"public use" or "necessity" criteria, the court of appeals reversed the
summary judgment in favor of the city and remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.24
II. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
The Texas Supreme Court in City of Keller v. Wilson25 provided clarifi-
cation regarding the relationship between municipal plat approval, the
requirements of the Texas Local Government Code, and inverse condem-
nation under Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution. The Fort
Worth Court of Appeals ruled that the City of Keller, by approving a
residential subdivision that allegedly flooded downstream property, was
liable for inverse condemnation. 26 Following an appeal by Keller, the
Texas Supreme Court, on June 10, 2005, reversed the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals and rendered judgment on behalf of the City.2 7
The City required a developer of a new subdivision to submit plans for
removal of run-off water that did not increase the flow or the velocity of
water to downstream property in conjunction with plat submittal. After
review and satisfaction that the developer's drainage plans met Keller's
criteria and requirements, Keller approved the plans and final plat and
authorized construction of infrastructure improvements.
As part of the process for plat approval and, ultimately, the building of
the subdivisions, Keller required the developer to provide for the re-
moval of run-off water resulting from a 100-year rain event. Keller also
required that the developer's drainage plan could not increase either the
20. 174 S.W.3d 889, 900 (Tex. App.-Austin, pet. denied).
21. Id. at 896-97.
22. Id. at 897.
23. Id. at 900.
24. Id. at 900, 906.
25. 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005).
26. City of Keller v. Wilson, 86 S.W.3d 693, 706 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet.
granted).
27. 168 S.W.3d at 830.
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flow or velocity of the water reaching downhill properties. These require-
ments were part of Keller's Master Drainage Plan.2 8
The engineer that designed the permanent drainage easement and
channel for the developers testified that the permanent drainage ease-
ment and channel were designed to comply with Keller's drainage re-
quirement that neither the flow nor velocity of water reaching
downstream properties would increase.29 To insure that the developer's
design of the permanent drainage easement would not increase the flow
or velocity of water on downstream properties, Keller instituted several
reviews of the design. First, Keller's engineering department reviewed
the design and found that it complied with Keller's Master Drainage Plan.
The Director of Public Works for Keller, a professional engineer, testified
that the developer's design placed the permanent drainage easement in
the area where water already flowed so as to follow the water's natural
flow. He also testified that, based on his training and experience, the de-
veloper's design did not increase the flow or velocity of water on down-
stream properties.30
Second, Keller inspectors inspected the construction of the drainage
improvements to assure that the construction complied with the devel-
oper's design. Third, Keller made a final inspection after the permanent
drainage easement and drainage improvements were completed, finding
that they complied with the developer's design.
Fourth, Keller commissioned an independent engineering firm to re-
view the developer's design to insure that the design conformed to Kel-
ler's Master Drainage Plan and other regulations. 31 An engineer with the
independent engineering firm commissioned by Keller testified that he
reviewed the developer's design for the permanent drainage easement
and concluded that the design was adequate to carry stormwater flow
resulting from a 10- to 100-year rain event. Keller's independent engineer
also concluded that the developer's design conformed to standard and
accepted engineering practices and procedures and that it would not in-
crease the floodwater run-off to downstream properties. Thereafter, Kel-
ler approved the final plat and the developer's drainage plans, and this
suit followed.
First, the court considered whether the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
erred by failing to consider the evidence contrary to the jury's finding
that Keller acted intentionally to cause flooding on private property. In
this case, the Wilsons sued over flooding that resulted, in part, from Kel-
ler's approval of a development plat upstream from the Wilsons' prop-
erty. Under Keller's Master Drainage Plan (the "1990 Plan"), a possible
drainage channel would have been cut across the Wilsons' property for
runoff from the upstream development. Keller approved the developer's
28. Id. at 808.
29. 86 S.W.3d at 706.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 701, 706.
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plan and plat without the channel, which engineers for the developer and
Keller and those who designed Keller's Master Drainage Plan believed
satisfied Keller regulations and the 1990 Plan. The court of appeals ex-
cluded the engineering evidence supporting the development and plat ap-
proval, holding that the jury could find that Keller acted with substantial
certainty that flooding would result. 32 The court also rejected Keller's
contention that all engineering testimony should be included in the re-
view, holding that it must consider only the evidence and inferences that
tended to support the findings of the trial court and disregard all evidence
and inferences to the contrary.33 The Texas Supreme Court rejected the
court of appeals' scope of review by holding that a reviewing court must
consider "all of the evidence" in the light favorable to the verdict (the
"inclusive standard"). 34
The court next considered the City of Keller's state of mind. The Wil-
sons had to prove Keller knew (not should have known) that flooding was
substantially certain to result from approval of the plans. The court held
that the reviewing court could not evaluate what Keller knew by disre-
garding most of what the court was told by three sets of reviewing engi-
neers. Moreover, when a case involves scientific or technical issues
requiring expert advice (as this one did), the jurors would not disregard a
party's reliance on experts hired for that very purpose without a reasona-
ble basis for doing so. 35 In Keller, three sets of engineers certified that
the development plans and plat met Keller's codes and regulations and
thus would not increase downstream flooding. 36 None of the evidence
cited by the court of appeals showed that Keller knew more than it was
told by the engineers.37 As the court explained, "The Wilsons' expert
testified that flooding was (in his opinion) inevitable, but not that the City
knew it was inevitable. ' 38 Keller witnesses admitted knowing that devel-
opment would "increase runoff at the head of this drainage system, but
not flooding at its foot."39 The omission of a drainage channel across the
Wilsons' property obviously raised concerns as to whether Keller prop-
erly investigated, but was not evidence that Keller knew that the advice
that it received in response was wrong.40
More importantly, the supreme court noted that the appellate court's
decision "ignores what the Wilsons had to prove-not that [Keller] might
have disbelieved the engineers' reports, but that it did. ' 41 The court
32. 168 S.W.3d at 808.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 807, 809.






40. Id. (Cf. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131, 140 (Tex. 2004)
(holding that complaint letters may require a manufacturer to investigate, but are not evi-
dence that complaints are true)).
41. Id. at 830.
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noted that "[t]his requires evidence of 'objective indicia of intent' show-
ing [Keller] knew identifiable harm was occurring or substantially certain
to result."' 42 Accordingly, Keller's approval of the development plan and
plat was not an intentional taking under Article I, section 17 of the Texas
Constitution. 43
III. HISTORIC PRESERVATION
In 2128 Bryan Street, Ltd. v. City of Dallas,44 the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals held that the purchaser of property in downtown Dallas was not
entitled to a permit to demolish an old high school on the property that
was included in an historic overlay district, which was designated as such
only after the permit application was submitted. In this case, before the
appellant owner purchased the property, the city landmark commission
instituted proceedings to consider whether the property should be desig-
nated a historic district. Under the Dallas City Code, the institution of
such proceedings triggered a moratorium on the acceptance of any appli-
cations for permits to alter or demolish structures on the property. The
moratorium was in effect when the appellant submitted its first applica-
tion for a demolition permit. At the time, the code provided that the
moratorium would end on the 180th day after the filing of a written re-
quest for hardship relief. The appellant filed the request, which was not
granted.45
Before the 180-day period expired, the city adopted a new ordinance
amending its historic regulations to delete the 180-day provision and add
new standards for demolition permits. The landowner demanded a dem-
olition permit, which was refused. The city contended that the applica-
tion was incomplete under the new regulations. Soon thereafter, the city
adopted an ordinance designating a portion of the appellant's property,
including the school, as an historic overlay district.46
The landowner then sued for a writ of mandamus ordering the city
building official to issue a demolition permit and for damages from al-
leged regulatory-taking and due-process violations. The trial court
granted the city's motion for summary judgment on the permit issue. Af-
ter a bench trial, the court also ruled for the city on the regulatory-taking
and due-process claims.47
On appeal, the appellant argued that Chapter 245 of the Texas Local
Government Code required the city to issue the demolition permit, de-
spite the adoption of the later ordinances for historic districts. The land-
owner contended that either its initial application or its hardship request
42. Id. (citing Tarrant Reg'I Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 555 (Tex. 2004)
(emphasis added)).
43. Id.
44. 175 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).




triggered the protection of Chapter 245. 48 However, the court of appeals
agreed with the city that Chapter 245 did not apply because no permit
application could be filed during the moratorium. The court also agreed
that, because new demolition standards were adopted for properties
under consideration for historic designation before the end of the mora-
torium, those standards properly applied to any subsequent permit
application. 49
In addition, the court upheld the trial court's denial of the owner's due-
process and regulatory-taking claims, finding that the opinions and con-
clusions of the owner's appraiser on the impact of the permit denial on
the property's value were not credible. 50
In Wyly v. Preservation Dallas, a nonprofit organization and the Histor-
ical District Association were held to have standing to prevent homeown-
ers from destroying a home in the Swiss Avenue Historic District.51 The
Dallas City Planning Commission ("CPC") authorized the demolition
and Preservation Dallas obtained a temporary restraining order to pre-
vent imminent destruction of the house. The historic district joined the
suit, claiming that proper notice was not posted before the CPC hearing.
Applying the three-prong test for associational standing, the Dallas
Court of Appeals initially held that both Preservation Dallas and the His-
torical District Association had members who owned homes in the dis-
trict. Those members had standing to sue in their own right.52 Second,
the purpose of both organizations was to preserve historical buildings,
which was germane to the issue in the suit. Third, the claim in the lawsuit
did not require that individual members participate in the lawsuit. 53
Because the trial court granted the temporary injunction without hold-
ing an evidentiary hearing, the court of appeals vacated the trial court's
order enjoining the Wylys from destroying the property.54 Further, the
court of appeals found that it did not have interlocutory appellate juris-
diction over the trial court's granting of mandamus relief ordering the
CPC to rehear the appeal of the Landmark Commission's decision, so the
appellate court took no action on the order.55
In re Gruebel addressed the issue of whether a certificate of appropri-
ateness from the Nacogdoches Historic Landmark Preservation Commit-
tee was required before demolition of a building located within the
Historic Overlay of the city.5 6 Dr. Gruebel sought a writ of injunction to
prevent the city from issuing a permit to demolish a building owned by
Commercial Bank.
48. Id. at 62-63.
49. Id. at 63.
50. Id. at 66.
51. 165 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
52. Id. at 464.
53. Id. at 464-65.
54. Id. at 465.
55. Id. at 466.
56. 153 S.W.3d 686, 688 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005, no pet. h.).
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During the pendency of the litigation, the city amended its comprehen-
sive zoning ordinance to delete the requirement that a landowner obtain
a certificate of appropriateness before demolishing a designated historic
landmark. While it is well settled that laws may not operate retroactively,
Dr. Gruebel, as a resident of the city, did not have a vested substantive
right in preventing the structure's demolition. As a result, the contro-
versy became moot.57
IV. ANNEXATION
In Smith v. City of Brownwood,58 the requirements for disannexing
thirteen acres of a 153-acre annexation were addressed. Sec-
tion 43.141 (a) of the Texas Local Government Code states that "a major-
ity of the qualified voters of an annexed area may petition the governing
body of the municipality to disannex the area if the municipality fails or
refuses to provide services [within the timeframe established in the stat-
ute]. ''59 The trial court held that Smith, an owner of less than ten percent
of the annexed land, did not have standing to trigger the disannexation
process.
The Eastland Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and held
that Smith did not have standing. The court reasoned that extending
water and sewer lines should be done in an orderly manner, and if an
individual owner could file suit for disannexation, this would potentially
subject the municipality to numerous suits. 60 While not particularly help-
ful for Smith, the Texas Legislature now allows an individual owner to file
a writ of mandamus to enforce the service plan for his or her tract.61 The
city then has the choice of complying with the service plan or disannexing
the smaller area.
In City of Alton v. City of Mission,62 the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals held that a city cannot unilaterally repeal an agreement defining the
extraterritorial jurisdiction ("ETJ") boundaries between the city and an-
nex the land in question. In 1991, the cities of Mission and Alton signed
identical ordinances agreeing to limitations on both cities' right to ETJ
beyond set limits. In 2001, Alton passed an ordinance repealing its 1991
ordinance and annexed outside of the ETJ described in the 1991 ordi-
nances. Mission sought a declaratory judgment that Alton breached their
agreement. Alton counterclaimed that the 1991 agreements only covered
subdivision regulations and did not give up Alton's power to annex prop-
erty within its ETJ. The trial court found that Alton's action of repealing
the ordinance was a breach of contract and granted Mission's summary
judgment. Alton appealed. 63
57. Id. at 689.
58. 161 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet. h.).
59. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 43.141(a) (Vernon 2005) (emphasis added).
60. Smith, 161 S.W.3d at 679.
61. Id. at 680.
62. 164 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. filed).
63. Id. at 865.
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While the court ruled that Alton could reduce its future ETJ, the court
also found that Mission did not automatically receive the reduced or re-
leased area. Specifically, the court of appeals held that the city ordi-
nances were unambiguous in defining extraterritorial jurisdiction for all
purposes and that the legislative purpose could not have been to allow
the expansion of one city's ETJ through the receipt of another city's fu-
ture ETJ.64 Legislation also provided that such ordinances were not just
for subdivision regulation. The court further held that ordinances were
contractual in nature; therefore, the city could not repeal an ordinance on
the basis of public good.65 Rather, a city's ETJ boundaries can only grow
by annexation, population growth, or request.66
In Hughes v. City of Rockwall, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that
private landowners had standing to seek arbitration under the Municipal
Annexation Act.67 Hughes was the executor of the Estate of
W.W. Caruth, Jr., which owned land in Rockwall's ETJ. The Estate de-
manded arbitration, but Rockwall refused, contending that the Estate
had no standing to demand arbitration unless compelled by a ruling in a
quo warranto suit brought by the State.68 Sparsely populated land is not
required to be included in a municipality's three-year annexation plan.
When a landowner is notified of a pending annexation, section 43.052(i)
of the Texas Local Government Code allows the landowner to include the
land in the three-year annexation plan.69 If the city refuses, the land-
owner can request arbitration to have an arbitrator determine if "no rea-
son exists under generally accepted municipal planning principles and
practices for separately annexing the area."'70
In this case, the court of appeals ruled that the legislature specifically
authorized a private person to seek arbitration in passing sec-
tion 43.052(i). As a result, the court reversed the trial court's order of
dismissal and directed the trial court to compel arbitration and to prohibit
annexation during the pendency of the annexation. 71
In City of San Antonio v. Summerglen Property Owners Ass'n, a home-
owners association and individual property owners were held not to have
standing to challenge the city's proposed annexation of the property.72
Following notice of the annexation, a series of negotiations regarding the
service plan were held between the city and area representatives. The
Summerglen representatives submitted an arbitration request, which was
denied on the grounds that it was premature in light of the pending nego-
tiations. Following the denial, suit was filed. The trial court denied the
city's plea to the jurisdiction and granted a temporary injunction.
64. Id. at 869.
65. Id. at 870.
66. Id.
67. 153 S.W.3d 709, 710 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. granted).
68. Id. at 712.
69. Id. at 711.
70. Id. at 711-12.
71. Id. at 714.
72. 185 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. filed).
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The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed. With respect to the arbi-
tration issue, the court discussed in detail the Hughes opinion. The city
argued that Hughes was distinguishable because it had not refused to ar-
bitrate and that the statutory right to arbitration could not prohibit an
annexation.73 The court of appeals agreed with the city, stating that the
city was only manually postponing arbitration until after negotiations
were concluded.74 Furthermore, the court held that the arbitration
should have been limited solely to the service plan under sec-
tion 43.0564(a) of the Texas Local Government Code.75 Finally, the court
of appeals held that House Bill 585, which prohibited the annexation, was
an unconstitutional local law.76
In Freeman v. Town of Flower Mound,77 the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals interpreted the disannexation provisions of section 43.141(a) of the
Texas Local Government Code. The Town annexed approximately 5,000
acres in 1999, and the Freemans filed a petition to disannex 1,200 acres.
The Town took no action on the petition, and the Freemans filed suit.
The question before the court of appeals was whether or not a majority
of the qualified voters within the 1,200-acre tract or the 5,000-acre tract
were necessary to trigger the disannexation process. The court held that,
because the service plan was prepared for the entire 5,044-acre tract, the
Freemans alone could not trigger the petition process.7 8 Therefore, the
trial court's granting of the Town's plea to the jurisdiction was deemed
proper.
V. ZONING
In Baird v. City of Melissa,79 a recreational vehicle park owner chal-
lenged the city's termination of the park as a nonconforming use. In
1991, the city amended its comprehensive zoning ordinance to delete RV
parks as a permitted use. In 2003, the city included a provision in its
comprehensive zoning ordinance to provide an "amortizing" mechanism
for nonconforming uses.80
The court held a hearing and gave Baird two and a half weeks to re-
move all RVs from the property. Following filing of the suit, the trial
court granted the city's motion for summary judgment. Addressing
Baird's claim of equitable estoppel, the Dallas Court of Appeals noted
that Baird increased the number of RVs from five to eighteen without
receiving permission from the city. As a result, this was not an "excep-
tional case" warranting equitable estoppel to prevent "manifest
injustice." 8 1
73. Id. at 85.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 86-87.
77. 173 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
78. Id. at 841.
79. 170 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
80. Id. at 924.
81. Id. at 928 (citing Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829, 836 (Tex. 1970)).
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